To Bradley Brooks — LEPC Planning Coordinator

Requested Agenda Items and Record Submission

July 8, 2026 Jefferson County Local Emergency Planning Committee Meeting

Submitted by David Ginsberg — June 29, 2026

Dear Mr. Brooks,

With the July 8th meeting now about a week away, my only request for the meeting itself is that this letter be distributed to the committee's members in advance and entered into the official record as a submitted document, so that it stands as part of the record.

I have organized this letter into lettered sections, with every individual question given its own number within each section, so that specific points can be referenced easily, for example as "Item D-3" or "Item L-9."

Section A: Foundational Documentation

I want to start by explaining where I am coming from. I do not have a background in how the Local Emergency Planning Committee has operated here, what has already been done, or how the committee is structured.

• A-1. Can I receive documentation of what the Local Emergency Planning Committee has done to date regarding PTPC, including any prior meeting minutes, plans, or reports specific to the facility?

• A-2. Can I receive documentation of how the Local Emergency Planning Committee is structured, including its bylaws and membership rules?

• A-3. How are decisions made by the committee?

• A-4. Can I receive a current list of the committee's members, including which organization or role each one represents?

• A-5. What are the dates of past meetings?

• A-6. Are there dates for any upcoming meetings beyond July 8th that are already scheduled?

• A-7. Have any votes taken place by the committee, and if so, on what?

• A-8. What was the result of each vote referenced in Item A-7?

• A-9. Have any requests been made by any of the participating member agencies or organizations to the committee, and if so, what were they?

• A-10. Have any requests been made by the committee to any of the participating member agencies or organizations, and if so, what were they?

• A-11. What came of the requests referenced in Items A-9 and A-10?

• A-12. Is there a schedule for when a draft emergency response plan specific to PTPC is expected to be completed, if one is being developed at all?

With that context, here are the specific items I would like the committee to consider, organized in two parts.

Part One: Olympic Gravity Water System

Section B: Water Pipeline Failure

This section concerns a failure of the Olympic Gravity Water System pipeline itself, as distinct from contamination of it. This affects not only Port Townsend and PTPC, but also Glen Cove and parts of unincorporated Jefferson County west of town.

• B-1. What is the worst case scenario for a failure of the pipeline itself?

• B-2. What is the plan for a failure of the pipeline itself?

• B-3. How would residents and businesses across all of the areas served, not just within city limits, obtain water for drinking, cooking, and bathing if the pipeline failed?

• B-4. For how long could an alternative water supply, if any, be sustained during a pipeline failure?

• B-5. Is there a redundant water source or second intake, separate from the single gravity-fed system?

• B-6. If there is no redundant source, would a pipeline failure mean there is no alternative supply for any of the areas served?

• B-7. How would the public across this entire service area be notified of a pipeline failure?

• B-8. What is the expected timeline for repair and restoration of service for a minor pipeline repair?

• B-9. What is the expected timeline for repair and restoration of service for a major structural failure of the pipeline?

• B-10. PTPC operates and maintains the entire 30-mile transmission system under lease, not only its own connection point. Does a major disaster at PTPC have the potential to interfere with the City's or other locations' water supply, even if the physical pipeline itself, located mostly in the watershed far from the mill, is not directly damaged?

• B-11. If PTPC's own operations and staff were disabled by a fire, explosion, or other major incident, who would be available to operate and maintain the pipeline in their place?

• B-12. For how long could the pipeline continue to be operated and maintained without PTPC before it affected water delivery to the City, Glen Cove, or unincorporated areas?

• B-13. Who would pay for repair of major damage to the pipeline, given the City owns the system and the water rights while PTPC operates and maintains it under lease?

• B-14. Does responsibility for the cost of repair depend on the cause of the damage, for example whether the damage originated at PTPC versus elsewhere along the pipeline's 30-mile route?

• B-15. Is that division of responsibility documented anywhere?

• B-16. Is there any insurance covering damage to the pipeline, held by either the City or PTPC?

• B-17. If such insurance exists, what does it cover?

• B-18. Would that insurance cover a major disaster scenario such as the ones described in this letter?

Section C: Olympic Gravity Water System, Other Emergencies

• C-1. Separate from a physical failure of the pipeline itself, addressed in Section B, has the committee considered contamination of the source water at the Big Quilcene or Little Quilcene diversions or at Lords Lake Reservoir?

• C-2. Has the committee considered a failure or major incident at the City's water treatment facility itself?

• C-3. What other emergency scenarios affecting the Olympic Gravity Water System, beyond pipeline failure and the two scenarios above, have been considered?

• C-4. What is the worst case scenario and plan for whatever has actually been considered under Items C-1 through C-3?

• C-5. What, if anything, related to the Olympic Gravity Water System has not yet been addressed by the committee?

Part Two: PTPC

Section D: Reference Point and Chemical Inventory

In researching this letter, I reviewed the Washington County, Maine Local Emergency Planning Committee's Hazardous Materials Plan, which includes a detailed annex for Woodland Pulp, a kraft pulp mill in Baileyville, Maine. That annex names specific roles and information that I have used to frame the following questions.

• D-1. The Maine annex names a Facility Emergency Coordinator, by name and title. Who fills that role for PTPC?

• D-2. The Maine annex names the nearest hazmat response team, by name. Who fills that role for PTPC?

• D-3. The Maine annex names the closest medical facility, by name. Is the closest medical facility for PTPC Jefferson Healthcare?

• D-4. Who is the emergency contact at the closest medical facility?

• D-5. Is there a representative from the closest medical facility on the Local Emergency Planning Committee?

• D-6. If so, who is that representative? I believe I was able to confirm that Apple Martine, Director of Jefferson County Public Health, fills the required public health representation seat, but I was not able to identify who fills the required emergency medical services seat specifically, separate from public health.

• D-7. The Maine annex names the chemicals of concern on site, by name and exact quantity. Does the committee have that list for PTPC?

• D-8. If so, can I have a copy of it? I would note that the Maine plan actually reports 28 chemicals on site in total at that facility, three of which carry the highest federal hazard designation as Extremely Hazardous Substances. I am asking for PTPC's complete chemical inventory under the federal Tier II reporting requirement, not only its most hazardous substances.

• D-9. The Maine plan states that in the event of a catastrophic cascading incident, first responders and the public may be at unanticipated high risk for inhalation illness or exposure due to various chemicals reacting with one another. Has this kind of cascading, multi-chemical risk been considered for PTPC? I raise this because it means the concern is not speculation on my part; it is a planning concern already named by a comparable facility's own emergency plan.

Section E: Fire

• E-1. What is the worst case scenario for a fire at PTPC?

• E-2. What is the plan for a fire at PTPC?

• E-3. What is the plan for employee and subcontractor safety during a fire, including evacuation and accounting for everyone on site?

• E-4. What is the plan for fire spread to adjacent chemical storage tanks?

• E-5. What is the plan for fire spread to the wastewater treatment basin?

• E-6. What is the plan for fire spread to other major equipment?

• E-7. What is the plan for fire spread beyond the facility's boundary toward neighboring properties or wildland areas?

• E-8. What toxic byproducts could be released into the air from chemicals burning?

• E-9. How would those airborne byproducts be monitored?

• E-10. How would those airborne byproducts be communicated to the public?

• E-11. What would be the results of major equipment, such as the recovery furnace or power boiler, being burned or damaged by fire?

• E-12. Would there be enough firefighters available to respond, given Jefferson County Department of Emergency Management has already confirmed it is a small department that relies extensively on volunteers and mutual aid?

• E-13. Would there be enough medical aid available to respond to a fire at PTPC?

• E-14. Is water the appropriate agent to fight a fire involving these specific chemicals?

• E-15. If water is not appropriate for some chemicals, what suppression method is required instead?

• E-16. Is there appropriate and sufficient protective equipment, including gas masks and other respiratory and chemical protection, available to first responders?

• E-17. Is there appropriate and sufficient protective equipment available to PTPC's own employees and subcontractors on site, who may need that protection before responders even arrive?

• E-18. I understand Jefferson County has real, recent experience coordinating wildfire evacuations, including a tabletop exercise last year. Has that wildfire evacuation experience and planning ever specifically considered PTPC, given what is stored there?

• E-19. What is the worst case scenario and plan for a large regional wildfire reaching or threatening the facility from outside?

Section F: Explosion and Implosion

The May 26, 2026 disaster at Nippon Dynawave in Longview was not an explosion in the conventional sense; it was an implosion, caused by a blockage that prevented air from backfilling a white liquor tank as liquid was pumped out, creating catastrophic negative pressure.

• F-1. Has the specific implosion mechanism from Longview, a blockage preventing air backfill during liquid removal, been evaluated against PTPC's own white liquor tanks?

• F-2. What is the worst case scenario for an implosion at PTPC?

• F-3. What is the plan for an implosion at PTPC?

• F-4. What is the worst case scenario for a conventional explosion at PTPC, whether from a pressure vessel, the recovery furnace, the power boiler, or another source of stored or generated pressure?

• F-5. What is the plan for a conventional explosion at PTPC?

• F-6. What is the plan for employee and subcontractor safety in an explosion or implosion?

• F-7. Workers at Longview reportedly had little to no warning before the implosion occurred there. How quickly can an implosion of this kind occur at PTPC?

• F-8. What is the plan for structural damage to surrounding equipment, buildings, or storage tanks resulting from either an explosion or an implosion?

• F-9. Workers at Longview had reported a structural warning to the Washington State Division of Occupational Safety and Health two months before the disaster, and no action was taken before the implosion occurred. Does PTPC have a process for workers to report structural concerns?

• F-10. Is the committee aware of whether any structural concerns have been reported by PTPC workers?

• F-11. What toxic byproducts could follow an explosion or implosion?

• F-12. What contamination of the surrounding ground, water, or bay could follow an explosion or implosion?

• F-13. How would the toxic results referenced in Items F-11 and F-12 be monitored?

• F-14. How would the toxic results referenced in Items F-11 and F-12 be communicated to the public?

• F-15. What is the suppression and containment plan for an explosion or implosion, separate from the fire suppression question in Item E-14?

• F-16. Are existing equipment and protocols adequate to contain a release of this kind once it has begun?

• F-17. What is the cleanup plan following an explosion or implosion?

• F-18. Who is responsible for cleanup following an explosion or implosion?

• F-19. What timeline is expected for cleanup following an explosion or implosion, given that the Longview disaster required ongoing environmental monitoring well after the initial incident?

• F-20. How would the public be informed when the area is actually safe again after an explosion or implosion?

Section G: Chemical Spill

• G-1. What is the worst case scenario for a chemical spill originating at PTPC?

• G-2. What is the plan for a chemical spill originating at PTPC?

• G-3. What specific chemicals, by name and typical or maximum quantity, are involved in a catastrophic white liquor release? I am asking for the actual chemical names and quantities, not a general category.

• G-4. What specific chemicals, by name and typical or maximum quantity, are involved in the smaller incidents described in Item G-11?

• G-5. What are PTPC's permitted discharge points and outfall locations into Port Townsend Bay?

• G-6. Are there other pathways, such as stormwater drains, ditches, or groundwater, through which a spill could reach the bay or surrounding area without passing through a permitted outfall?

• G-7. What is the plan for employee and subcontractor safety during a spill, including how they would be alerted?

• G-8. What is the plan for evacuating employees and subcontractors from the immediate area during a spill?

• G-9. What is the plan for decontaminating employees and subcontractors if directly exposed during a spill?

• G-10. What are the specific health and environmental risks of each chemical involved in a spill, including risks to workers from direct contact or inhalation, and risks to marine life, shellfish beds, and public health from the chemical reaching the bay?

• G-11. The November 2025 wastewater spills and the October 2025 aerated stabilization basin issue remain open, according to Washington State Department of Ecology's own account. What specifically happened in each of these two incidents?

• G-12. What chemicals or substances were involved in the two incidents referenced in Item G-11?

• G-13. What is the current status of the two incidents referenced in Item G-11?

• G-14. Does Jefferson County Emergency Management have any role in responding to incidents at the scale described in Item G-11, or is that considered Ecology's matter exclusively, with no county involvement at all?

• G-15. Which specific agencies would need to be contacted in the event of a spill?

• G-16. In what order would the agencies referenced in Item G-15 be contacted?

• G-17. Who would be responsible for making those contacts?

• G-18. What is the specific backup contact for each agency referenced in Item G-15, in case the primary contact is unreachable?

• G-19. What specifically would be tested as part of environmental monitoring following a spill?

• G-20. Where would the testing referenced in Item G-19 take place?

• G-21. For how long would monitoring continue following a spill, given that the Longview disaster required ongoing monitoring of drainage ditches well after the initial event?

Section H: Equipment Failure Not Resulting in Fire, Explosion, or Spill

• H-1. Does the Local Emergency Planning Committee have a complete list of all major equipment and infrastructure at PTPC?

• H-2. If such a list exists, can I receive a copy of it?

• H-3. What is the worst case scenario for a failure of PTPC's major equipment or infrastructure that does not itself cause an immediate fire, explosion, or chemical release, but could still create a hazard or compromise safety?

• H-4. What is the plan for the kind of equipment failure described in Item H-3?

• H-5. What happens to chemical storage, containment, and treatment systems during a power failure or loss of process control affecting the recovery furnace, the power boiler, or the wastewater treatment system, even without an immediate visible release?

• H-6. What is the plan for a structural failure of a containment or treatment system, such as the wastewater treatment basin, that compromises its function without an immediate, visible spill, for example a slow leak or a breach that is not immediately obvious?

• H-7. Has the committee identified any other major equipment failure that does not fall under Section E, F, or G specifically?

Section I: Worker, Subcontractor, and Agency Access

• I-1. Beyond what is addressed under Sections E through H, does PTPC have a general internal emergency evacuation plan covering its own employees and any subcontractors on site?

• I-2. Has the plan referenced in Item I-1 been shared with or reviewed by the committee?

• I-3. Do East Jefferson Fire Rescue, Jefferson County Emergency Management, and Washington State Department of Ecology have established physical access protocols to the PTPC site, including site maps and gate access?

• I-4. Is there a designated facility emergency contact for physical access purposes, separate from the Facility Emergency Coordinator referenced in Item D-1?

• I-5. If established access protocols do not exist, would access need to be negotiated at the time of an incident?

• I-6. Has any security incident at the facility, including an active threat or workplace violence, been considered?

• I-7. How would a security incident of the kind described in Item I-6 coordinate with the site's chemical hazards, for example, would an evacuation or lockdown protocol account for the location of chemical storage?

• I-8. Do responding law enforcement personnel have the same site familiarity requested of fire and emergency management agencies in Item I-3?

Section J: Public Notification and Protective Action

• J-1. For each of the scenarios described in Sections E through H, what would residents actually be told to do?

• J-2. Through what channel would the information described in Item J-1 be delivered?

• J-3. Are there pre-drafted public alerts for the scenarios described in Sections E through H?

• J-4. Are there defined evacuation or shelter-in-place zones for the scenarios described in Sections E through H?

• J-5. Is there a designated public information channel for each of the scenarios described in Sections E through H?

• J-6. If the items referenced in J-3 through J-5 do not currently exist, would that messaging be developed in real time during an actual event?

Section K: PTPC's Own Role as a Committee Member

• K-1. PTPC is itself a member of this committee, not merely the facility being discussed. As a member, what has PTPC formally committed to the committee regarding white liquor tank safety?

• K-2. PTPC announced publicly on June 1, 2026 that it had met with industry experts and was scheduling non-destructive testing of its tanks. That announcement was made to the press, not to the committee specifically. Non-destructive testing covers inspection methods, such as ultrasonic thickness testing or similar techniques, that check a tank's structural condition without taking it out of service. What has PTPC formally reported to the committee about this testing, including what specifically is being tested, by what method, on what schedule, and with what results once available, separate from what the public has been told through the press?

• K-3. What has PTPC formally committed to or reported to the committee regarding any of the other scenarios raised in this letter?

• K-4. Has PTPC, in its committee capacity, shared any internal emergency response plan with the committee, separate from its public statements to the press?

• K-5. Has PTPC, in its committee capacity, shared any tank inventory with the committee, separate from its public statements to the press?

• K-6. Has PTPC, in its committee capacity, shared any testing results with the committee, separate from its public statements to the press?

Section L: Seismic Event

Having asked about each of the scenarios above individually, fire, explosion or implosion, chemical spill, equipment failure, and water system emergencies, I want to close with the scenario that ties them together. PTPC sits at or very near the Southern Whidbey Island Fault, which the United States Geological Survey describes as capable of generating earthquakes of magnitude 7 or greater.

• L-1. Does the Local Emergency Planning Committee have a complete list of all major equipment and infrastructure at PTPC, as requested in Item H-1?

• L-2. What is the worst case scenario for a chemical release at PTPC triggered by a seismic event, as opposed to plans addressing only a release that has already occurred from an unspecified cause?

• L-3. What is the plan for a chemical release at PTPC triggered by a seismic event?

• L-4. The Maine plan referenced in Item D-9 explicitly identifies cascading, multi-chemical risk as a real planning concern at a comparable facility, not merely a hypothetical I am raising on my own. Has the committee considered the risk of chemicals from different storage systems mixing in unintended ways as a result of a seismic event at PTPC?

• L-5. What is the worst case scenario for that kind of chemical mixing as a result of a seismic event?

• L-6. What is the plan for that kind of chemical mixing as a result of a seismic event?

• L-7. What would the results be if there were major damage to the recovery furnace as a result of a seismic event?

• L-8. What would the results be if there were major damage to the power boiler as a result of a seismic event?

• L-9. What would the results be if there were major damage to connecting pipework as a result of a seismic event?

• L-10. What would the results be if there were major damage to any other major equipment on the list requested in Item H-1, as a result of a seismic event?

• L-11. What is the worst case scenario and plan for each of the equipment failures described in Items L-7 through L-10?

• L-12. What is the worst case scenario and plan for a fire resulting from seismic damage to equipment or from mixed chemicals?

• L-13. What is the worst case scenario and plan for release of treated and untreated wastewater from damage to the treatment basin or related infrastructure during a seismic event?

• L-14. What is the worst case scenario and plan for collapsed or damaged buildings at the facility itself during a seismic event?

• L-15. What is the plan for employees potentially trapped inside collapsed or damaged buildings during a seismic event?

• L-16. What is the worst case scenario and plan for the safety of PTPC's own employees and any subcontractors on site during a seismic event, separate from the plan for community members beyond the facility's boundary?

• L-17. How would employees and subcontractors be accounted for during a seismic event?

• L-18. How would employees and subcontractors be evacuated or rescued if trapped during a seismic event?

• L-19. A single seismic event could plausibly cause several or all of the failures described in Items L-2 through L-14 at the same moment, rather than as isolated, separate incidents, each compounding the others, for example a fire spreading more easily because containment systems were also damaged, or rescue of trapped employees being delayed because the area is also a chemical release site. What is the plan if several or all of these failures happen simultaneously?

• L-20. The same earthquake capable of causing the facility level failures described above would also likely damage roads and bridges throughout Jefferson County, cutting off evacuation and access routes; disrupt power and cellular communications; and damage the county's own water infrastructure, including the Olympic Gravity Water System. What is the plan if a seismic event overwhelms available resources entirely, because the county as a whole, not just PTPC, has been affected at the same time?

• L-21. An existing 2021 engineering white paper for the Olympic Gravity Water System already discusses liquefaction risk to a downstream hazard dam in this system during a design earthquake, and Washington State Department of Ecology's Office of Dam Safety already inspects this dam every five years given the risk to life and property if it were to fail. I raise this because it means the seismic vulnerability of this water system is not a new concern I am introducing, but one already documented in the system's own engineering record. Has the scenario of dam failure during a seismic event been incorporated into the county wide emergency response plan referenced in Item L-20?

• L-22. If the water pipeline goes down during a county wide seismic event, how would residents get water for drinking, cooking, and bathing?

• L-23. For how long could the water supply situation described in Item L-22 be sustained?

• L-24. If the air becomes too dangerous to breathe near the facility during a county wide seismic event, how would that be communicated to residents?

• L-25. How would people actually be moved out of the danger zone described in Item L-24 if roads are damaged and normal evacuation routes are not available?

• L-26. Hurricane Katrina demonstrated how a single disaster can simultaneously disable communications, transportation, and the distribution of basic supplies like food and water, leaving people stranded for days even after the initial event has passed. Does Jefferson County's planning account for that same kind of extended aftermath, not just the first hours of a response, following a major seismic event?

As noted at the start of this letter, my only essential request is that this letter be distributed to the committee and entered into the official record.

Thank you for your time and your attention to this.

Respectfully,